Abstract-Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols are designed to be secure even when the secret key used for authentication is a human-memorable password. In this paper, we consider PAKE protocols in the group scenario, in which a group of clients, each of them shares a password with an "honest but curious" server, intend to establish a common secret key (i.e., a group key) with the help of the server. In this setting, the key established is known to the clients only and no one else, including the server. Each client needs to remember passwords only while the server keeps passwords in addition to private keys related to his identity. Towards our goal, we present a compiler that transforms any group key exchange (KE) protocol secure against a passive eavesdropping to a group PAKE which is secure against an active adversary who controls all communication in the network. This compiler is built on any group KE protocol (e.g., the Burmester-Desmedt protocol), any identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme (e.g., Gentry's scheme), and any identity-based signature (IBS) scheme (e.g., Paterson-Schuldt scheme). It adds only two rounds and O(1) communication (per client) to the original group KE protocol. As long as the underlying group KE protocol, IBE scheme and an IBS scheme have provably security without random oracles, a group PAKE constructed by our compiler can be proven to be secure without random oracles.
Introduction
Popularity of group-oriented applications and protocols is currently on the increase and, as a result, group communication is taking place in many different settings, from network layer multicasting to application layer tele-and video-conferencing. Securing group communication makes demands of protocols for group authenticated key exchange (AKE), which allows a group of users communicating over an insecure public network to establish a common secret key (i.e., a group key) and furthermore to be guaranteed that they are indeed sharing this key with each other.
Protocols for 2-party AKE has been extensively investigated in [36, 15, 37, 13, 11, 32, 33, 34] . A number of works have considered extending the 2-party Diffie-Hellman protocol [36] to the multi-party setting [43, 57, 29, 58, 10, 50, 51] . Among them, the works of Ingemarsson et al. [43] , Burmester and Desmedt [29] , and Steiner et al. [58] may be the most well-known. They are merely key exchange (KE) protocols, intended to be secure against a passive adversary only.
model.
Organization. In Section 2, we introduce a new model for ID-based group PAKE. In Section 3, we describe the underlying cryptographic primitives to build our group PAKE. Then, in Section 4, we present a new ID-based group PAKE compiler. After that, in Section 5, the brief security proof for our protocol is given. We conclude this paper in Section 6. In addition, the detail security proof is provided in Appendix.
Definitions
A formal model of security for group PAKE was firstly given by Bresson et al. in [25, 26] (based on Bellare et al.'s formal model for 2-party PAKE [12] ), and improved by Abdalla et al. in [1] . Boneh and Franklin were the first to define chosen ciphertext security for IBE under chosen identity attack [17, 18] . In this section, we put forward a new model of security for ID-based group PAKE, on the basis of definitions given by Bresson Participants, Initialization and Passwords. An ID-based group PAKE protocol involves three kinds of participants: (1) A set of clients (denoted as Client); (2) A set of servers (denoted as Server), which behave in an honest but curious manner; (3) A Private Key Generator (PKG), which generates public parameters and corresponding private keys for servers, and behaves in an honest but curious manner as well. We assume that ClientServerPair is the set of pairs of the client and the server, who share a password. In addition, User = Client Server and Client Server = ∅.
Prior to any execution of the protocol, we assume that an initialization phase occurs. During initialization, PKG generates public parameters for the protocol, which are available to all participants, and issues private keys for each server. For any pair (A, S) ∈ ClientServerPair, the client A and the server S are assumed to share the same password pw S A . We assume that the client A chooses pw S A independently and uniformly at random from a "dictionary" D = {pw 1 , pw 2 , · · · , pw N } of size N , where N is a fixed constant which is independent of the security parameter. The password pw S A is then stored at the server S for authentication. After initialization, a server can be still added to the system as long as it obtains its private key related to its identity from PKG. A client can join the system once he shares his password with a server.
Execution of the Protocol. In the real world, a protocol determines how users behave in response to input from their environments. In the formal model, these inputs are provided by the adversary. Each user is assumed to be able to execute the protocol multiple times (possibly concurrently) with different partners. This is modeled by allowing each user to have unlimited number of instances with which to execute the protocol. We denote instance i of user U as U i . A given instance may be used only once. The adversary is given oracle access to these different instances. Furthermore, each instance maintains (local) state which is updated during the course of the experiment. In particular, each instance U i has associated with it the following variables, initialized as NULL or FALSE (as appropriate) during the initialization phase.
• sid i U and pid i U are variables (initialized as NULL) denoting the session identity and partner identity for an instance, respectively. The session identity sid i U is simply a way to keep track of the different executions of a particular user U . The partner identity pid i U is the set of users with whom U i believes it is interacting to establish a session key (including U itself).
• acc i U and term i U are boolean variables (initialized as FLASE) denoting whether a given instance has been accepted or terminated, respectively. Termination means that the given instance has done receiving and sending messages, acceptance indicates successful termination. In our case, acceptance means that the instance is sure that a group key has been established, thus, when an instance U i accepts, sid i U and pid i U are no longer NULL.
• used i U is a boolean variable (initialized as FLASE) denoting whether an instance has begun executing the protocol. This is a formalism which will ensure each instance is used only once.
• state i U (initialized as NULL) records any state necessary for execution of the protocol by a user instance U i .
• sk i A is a variable (initialized as NULL) denoting the session key for a client instance A i . Computation of the session key is, of course, the ultimate goal of the protocol. When A i accepts (i.e., acc i A = TRUE), sk i A is no longer NULL.
The adversary A is assumed to have complete control over all communications in the network and the adversary's interaction with the users (more specifically, with various instances) or PKG is modeled via access to oracles which we describe now. The state of an instance may be updated during an oracle call, and the oracle's output may depend upon the relevant instance. The oracle types are as follows:
have not yet been used (where A ∈ Client, S ∈ Server, (A , S) ∈ ClientServerPair, = 1, 2, · · · , n), this oracle executes the protocol among these instances and outputs the transcript of this execution. This oracle call represents passive eavesdropping of a protocol execution. In addition to the transcript, the adversary receives the values of sid, pid, acc, and term for all instances, at each step of protocol execution.
• Send(U i , M ) -This sends message M to instance U i . Assuming term i U = FALSE, this instance runs according to the protocol specification, updating state as appropriate. The output of U i (i.e., the message sent by the instance) is given to the adversary, who receives the updated values of sid i U , pid i U , acc i U , and term i U . This oracle call models the active attack to a protocol.
• KeyGen(PKG, S) -This sends the identity of the server S to PKG, which generates private keys d S corresponding to S and forwards it to the adversary. This oracle models possible compromising of a server due to, for example, hacking into the server. This implies that all passwords stored in the server are disclosed.
• Corrupt(A) -This query allows the adversary to learn the passwords of the client A, which models the possibility of subverting a client by, for example, witnessing a user type in his password, or installing a "Trojan horse" on his machine. This implies that all passwords held by A are disclosed.
• Reveal(A i ) -This outputs the current value of session key sk i A for a client instance if acc i A = TRUE. This oracle call models possible leakage of session keys due to, for example, improper erasure of session keys after use, or cryptanalysis.
• Test(A i ) -This oracle does not model any real-world capability of the adversary, but is instead used to define security of the session key of client instance A i . If acc i A = TRUE and sk i A = NULL, a random bit b is generated. If b = 0, the adversary is given sk i A , and if b = 1 the adversary is given a random session key. The adversary is allowed a single Test query, at any time during its execution.
A passive adversary is given access to the Execute, KeyGen, Reveal, Corrupt, and Test oracles, while an active adversary is additionally given access to the Send oracles. We assume that all servers behave in a honest but curious manner. We can imagine a server as a passive adversary who have already queried a KeyGen oracle to retrieve the server's private keys and all passwords stored in it. In addition, we assume that all servers have no access to any form of Send oracles. In the definition of Execute and Send oracles, we reasonably require that A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n share different passwords with the same server S.
Partnering. We say that client instances A i and B j are partnered if there exists a server instance S k associated with A i and B j such that (1) pid Freshness. Informally, the adversary succeeds if it can guess the bit b used by a Test oracle. Before formally defining the adversary's success, we must first define a notion of freshness. A client instance A i is fresh unless one of the following is true at the conclusion of the experiment, namely, at some point,
• The adversary queried Reveal(A i ) or Reveal(B j ) with the client instances A i and B j being partnered.
• The adversary queried KeyGen(PKG, S) where the server instance S ∈ pid i A , before a query of the form Send(U , M ), where U ∈ pid i A , has taken place, for some message M (or identities).
• The adversary queried Corrupt(A) or Corrupt(B) with the client instance A i and B j being partnered, before a query of the form Send(U , M ), where U ∈ pid i A , has taken place, for some message M (or identities).
Note that a client instance is fresh to a server or PKG adversary as long as the first event did not happen, because the server or PKG adversary has no access to any Send oracles and the last two events always happen.
The adversary is thought to succeed only if its Test query is made to a fresh instance. Note that this is necessary for any reasonable definition of security, otherwise, the adversary could always succeed, e.g., submitting a Test query for an instance for which it had already submitted a Reveal query. In addition, a server instance S j is fresh if any client instance A i such that (A, S) ∈ ClientServerPair, sid Advantage of the adversary. We say an adversary A succeeds if it makes a single query Test(A i ) to a fresh client instance A i , with acc i A = TRUE at the time of this query, and outputs a single bit b with b = b (recall that b is the bit chosen by the Test oracle). We denote this event by Succ. The advantage of adversary A in attacking protocol P is a function in the security parameter k, defined as
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by the adversary and the random coins used during the course of the experiment (including the initialization phase). It remains to define what we mean by a secure protocol. Note that a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary can always succeed by trying all passwords one-by-one in an online impersonation attack. This is possible since the size of the password dictionary is constant. Informally, a protocol is secure if this is the best an adversary can do. Formally, an instance U i represents an online attack if both the following are true at the time of the Test query: (1) at some point, the adversary queried Send(U i , * ), and (2) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(A j ) or Test(A j ), where the client instance A j ∈ pid i U . In particular, instances with which the adversary interacts via Execute, KeyGen, Reveal and Corrupt queries are not counted as online attacks. The number of online attacks represents a bound on the number of passwords the adversary could have tested in an online fashion. Definition 1. Protocol P is a secure protocol for password-authenticated key exchange if, for all dictionary size N and for all PPT adversaries A making at most Q(k) online attacks, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
The above definition ensures that the adversary can (essentially) do no better than guess a single password during each online attack. Calls to the Execute, KeyGen, Reveal and Corrupt oracles, which are not included in Q(k), are of no help to the adversary in breaking the security of the protocol. This means the passive attacks and offline dictionary attacks are of no use.
Forward secrecy. We follow the definition of forward secrecy from [47, 1] and consider the weak corrupt model of [12] , in which corrupting a client means retrieving his passwords, while asking KeyGen query on a server means retrieving its private keys and all passwords stored in it. Forward secrecy is then achieved if such queries do not give the adversary any information about previous agreed session keys. In addition, we follow the definition of freshness from [1] . The adversary is allowed to ask the Test query on a client instance, where he has known (1) the passwords of the client or any of his partners by Corrupt query; or (2) the private key of the server and all password stored in it by KeyGen query, however, he has not asked any Send query to the instance of the client or any of his partners. In this sense, the above definition of security implies forward secrecy.
Key privacy with respect to the server. The notion of key privacy respect to the server was introduced in [3] to capture the idea where the session key shared between two instances should only be known to these two instances and no one else, including the server, who behaves in an honest but curious manner. In our model, the server can be imagined as a passive adversary who has already queried a KeyGen oracle to retrieve the server's private keys and all passwords stored in it. On the basis of the above definition for forward secrecy, key privacy with respect to the server is implied in forward secrecy.
Cryptographic Building Blocks

Group Key Exchange
A group key exchange (KE) protocols allow users of a group communicating over an insecure public network to establish a common secret key (i.e., a group key), where the shared secret key is derived by two or more users as a function of the information contributed by, or associated with, each of these, (ideally) such that no user can predetermine the resulting key. They are intended to be secure against the passive adversary only. A passive adversary is given access to the Execute, Reveal, and Test oracles as defined in Section 2. In the definition of Execute oracle, we reasonably require that different executions yield different group session keys.
We say a passive adversary A succeeds if it makes a single query Test(A i ) to a fresh instance A i (i.e., no Reveal oracle is queried to A i and his partnered instances), and outputs a single bit b with b = b (recall that b is the bit chosen by the Test oracle). We denote this event by Succ. The advantage of a passive adversary A in attacking a group KE protocol P is a function in the security parameter k, defined as Adv
A group KE protocol P is secure against passive eavesdropping if no polynomial bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in attacking it.
The group KE protocols proposed by Ingemarsson et al. [43] , Burmester and Desmedt [29] , and Steiner et al. [58] may be the most well-known. Among them, Burmester-Desmedt protocol has been shown to be secure against passive eavesdropping in the standard model by Katz and Yung [48] .
Identity-Based Encryption
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is specified by four randomized algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt as follows.
• Setup: On input a security parameter k, it returns params (public system parameters) and master-key (known only to the "Private Key Generator").
• Extract: On inputs params, master-key and a public identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , it returns a private key d.
• Encrypt: On inputs params, ID, and a message M ∈ M (the plaintext space), it returns a ciphertext C ∈ C (the ciphertext space).
• Decryption: On inputs params, C ∈ C, and a private key d, it returns M ∈ M.
Chosen ciphertext security is the standard acceptable notion of security for a public key encryption scheme. An IBE scheme is semantically secure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack if no polynomial bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the following game:
• Initialize: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm, gives params to the adversary, but keeps the master-key to itself.
• P hase 1: The adversary adaptively asks a number of different queries q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q m , where
• Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a pair of equal length plaintexts (M 0 , M 1 ) and an identity ID on which it wishes to be challenged, where ID must not appear in Phase 1. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends C = Encrypt(ID, M b ) as the challenge to the adversary.
• P hase 2: The adversary issues more queries q m+1 , q m+2 , · · · , q n adaptively as in Phase 1, except that the adversary may not request a private key for ID or the decryption of (ID, C).
• Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b.
We define the adversary A's advantage in attacking the IBE scheme as a function of the security parameter k, Adv
, where the probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. The most efficient identity-based encryption schemes are currently based on bilinear pairings on elliptic curves, such as the Weil or Tate pairings. Boneh and Franklin [17, 18] were the first to give an IBE scheme from Weil pairing and prove it to be adaptive chosen-ciphertext security in the random oracle model. More recently, several new IBE schemes from pairing (e.g., [60] [39]) were proposed and proven to be adaptive chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model. A common feature of the latest IBE schemes is that the plaintext space is a cyclic group of prime order.
Identity-Based Signature
An identity-based signature (IBS) scheme can be described by four algorithms Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify as follows.
• Extract: Given params, master-key and a public identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , it returns a private key d ID .
• Sign: Given a message M , params, ID and a private key d ID , it generates a signature σ of the user (with identity ID) on M .
• Verify: Given a signature σ, a message M , and params, ID, it outputs accept if σ is a valid signature of the user (with identity ID) on M , and outputs reject otherwise.
An IBS scheme is existential unforgeability under the chosen message attack [41] if no polynomial bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the following game:
• Queries: The adversary adaptively asks a number of different queries q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q m , where q i is either Extract(ID i ) or Sign(ID i , M ).
• F orgery: Once the adversary decides that queries are over, it outputs a message M , an identity ID and a string σ . The adversary succeeds (denoted as Succ) if Verify(ID , M , σ ) = 1, where ID cannot appear in Extract queries and (ID , M ) cannot appear in Sign queries.
We define the adversary A's advantage in attacking the IBS scheme as a function of the security parameter k, Adv
, where the probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
A generic approach to construct IBS schemes is to use an ordinary (i.e., non-identity-based) signature scheme and simply attach a certificate containing the public key of the signer to the signature [38] . An IBS scheme with provable security in the standard model was given by Paterson and Schuldt in [54] .
Decisonal Squaring Diffie-Hellman Problem
The computational squaring Diffie-Hellman (CSDH) problem in a cyclic group G with a prime order q and a generator g is: Given g, g a where a is randomly chosen from Z * q , determine g a 2 . The problem is as hard as Diffie-Hellman problem [53, 30, 9] .
The decisional squaring Diffie-Hellman (DSDH) problem in a cyclic group G with a prime order q and a generator g is to distinguish between two distributions (g, g a , g a 2 ) (dentoed as b = 0) and (g, g a , z) (denoted as b = 1), where a is randomly chosen from Z * q and z is randomly chosen from G. This problem is not harder than the decisional DH problem, but we believe that this problem can still be hard, that is, we can assume that the advantage of any PPT algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} in solving the DSDH problem is negligible, namely,
is negligible, where the probability is over the random choice of a in Z * q and z in G, and the random bits consumed by A.
An Efficient Compiler for Group PAKE
Description of the Compiler
In this section, we present an efficient compiler transforming any group KE protocol P to a group PAKE protocol P .
Following the communication model given in [3] , we assume that arbitrary point-to-point connections among clients and servers to be available. The network is non-private and fully asynchronous, that is, the adversary may delay, eavesdrop, insert and delete message at will.
Given a group KE protocol P , our compiler constructs a group PAKE protocol P as shown in Fig. 1 , in which n clients A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n (in lexicographic order) wish to establish a common authenticated secret key (i.e., a group key) with the help of a server S. A completely formal specification of the group PAKE protocol will appear in Section 5, where we give a brief proof of security for the protocol in the security model described in Section 2.
We present the protocol by describing initialization and execution. The cryptographic building blocks of our protocol include a group KE protocol, an IBE scheme and an IBS scheme. We let k be the security parameter given to the setup algorithm.
Initialization. Given a security parameter k ∈ Z * , the initialization includes:
Parameter Generation: On input k, (1) PKG runs Setup P of the group KE protocol P to generate system parameters, denoted as params P ; (2) PKG runs Setup E of the IBE scheme to generate public system parameters for the IBE scheme, denoted as params E , and the secret master-key E for itself; (3) PKG runs Setup S of the IBS scheme to generate public system parameters for the IBS scheme, denoted as params S , and the secret master-key S for itself; In addition, PKG chooses a large cyclic group G with a prime order q and a generator g, and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → M (where M is the plaintext space of IBE), from a collision-resistant hash family. The public system parameters for the protocol P is params = {H, G, q, g} params P params E params S and the secret (master-key E , master-key S ) is known only to PKG.
Round 0 (Group Key Exchange (P )) Fig. 1 . ID-based group PAKE protocol P Key Generation: On input the identity ID S of a server S ∈ Server, params, and (master-key E , master-key S ), PKE runs Extract E of the IBE scheme and sets the decryption key of S to be d S , and runs Extract S of the IBS scheme and sets the signing key of S to be d S .
Password Generation: On input (A, S) ∈ ClientServerPair, a string pw S A , the password, is uniformly drawn by the client A from the dictionary Password = {pw 1 , pw 2 , · · · , pw N }, and then store it in the server S.
Protocol Execution. For a group of clients A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n (in lexicographic order), where there exists a server S such that (A , S) ∈ ClientServerPair, when A (having password pw S A ) ( = 1, 2, · · · , n) agree to establish a common authenticated secret key (i.e., a group key) via S, they firstly run the group KE protocol P and each client A computes the initial group key sk P A . Note that the clients may not be authentic and the initial group key derived by different clients in the same session may not be equal. Mutual authentication and key confirmation run as follows.
Each client A compute sid A = g sk P A and an IBE encryption of H(sid A |pid A |pw S A ) based on the identity ID S of the server, denoted as Auth . Then msg A = A |sid A |Auth is submitted to the server S.
Upon receiving the messages msg A ( = 1, 2, · · · , n), the server S lets sid S = sid A 1 and decrypts the ciphertexts with its decryption key d S , and verifies whether
If equation (1) holds for = 1, 2, · · · , n, the server S uses its signing key d S to generate a signature Auth S = S d S [pid S |sid S ], and then broadcasts msg S = S|Auth S .
Upon receiving msg S , each client A checks if
If equation (2) holds, A computes g
and accepts it as the authenticated group key sk P A .
Correctness
, that is, sk
. Thus, our protocol meets correctness.
Explicit authentication. By verifying equation (1) which involves the password pw S A , the partner identity pid S and the initial group key sk P A for = 1, 2, · · · , n, the server S can make sure the authenticity of each client A and the initial group key. By verifying equation (2) which involves the signature of the server, each client A is convinced of the authenticity of the server S, other partners and the initial group key. If both equations (1) and (2) hold, all clients are legitimate, the initial group key is genuine and thus the final group key g
is authentic. This shows that the group PAKE protocol P achieves explicit authentication, that is, each client knows that its intended partners have successfully computed a matching session key (i.e, a group key).
Trust model. The protocol compiler for group PAKE given by Abdalla et al. [1] is applicable where each user of the group is honest. If two adjacent users are dishonest, they can conspire to include one (or several) impersonating attacker(s) between them, while other users are unaware of this attack. Our compiler assumes that there exist "honest but curious" servers, which are trusted to authenticate users of the group, but may perform passive attacks on the protocol to retrieve the group key. In terms of trust management, we believe that our compiler is more practical than Abdalla et al.'s compiler.
Efficiency consideration. The efficiency of our group PAKE protocol depends on performance of the underlying group KE protocol, IBE and IBS schemes. Only two rounds are added to the original group KE protocol P . In these two rounds, each client sends out one message and receives one message only. This compiler adds only O(1) communication (per client) to the original group KE protocol. If our compiler employs Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange protocol, our group PAKE protocol has 4 rounds only. The communication cost of each client is O(2n) bits, where n is the number of clients. If Abdalla et al.'s compiler employs KOY 2-PAKE protocol [46] and constructs the commitment scheme with Cramer-Shoup public key encryption scheme [35] , their group PAKE protocol has 5 rounds. The communication cost of each user is O(6n) bits. In this sense, we believe that our compiler is more efficient than Abdalla et al.'s compiler. Note that we take into account cryptographic blocks with provably security in the standard model only.
Proof of Security
We follow the methods of the security proofs given in [48, 46] to prove the security of our compiler without random oracles. First of all, we provide a formal specification of the group PAKE protocol by specifying the initialization phase and the oracles to which the adversary has access, as shown in Fig. 2−4 .
During the initialization phase for security parameter k, algorithm Initialize generates params = {G, q, g, H} params P params E params S and the secret (master-key E , master-key S ) at first. Furthermore, the sets Client, Server, ClientServerPair are determined. Passwords for clients are chosen at random, and then stored at corresponding servers. Fig. 3 . Specification of the Execute, KeyGen, Corrupt, Reveal, Test oracles The description of the Execute oracle matches the high-level protocol described in Fig. 1 U , term i U ) associated with instance U i . Given an adversary A, we imagine a simulator that runs the protocol for A. More preciously, the simulator begins by running algorithm Initialize(1 k ) (which includes choosing passwords for clients) and giving the public output of the algorithm to A. When A queries an oracle, the simulator also responds by executing the appropriate algorithm. The simulator also records all state information defined during the course of the experiment.
Fig. 2. Specification of the initialize
In particular, when the adversary completes its execution and outputs a bit b , the simulator can tell whether the adversary succeeds by checking whether (1) a single Test query was made, for some client instance U i ; (2) acc i U was true at the time of Test query; (3) instance U i is fresh; and (4) b = b. Success of the adversary is denoted by event Succ. For any experiment P we define Adv
− 1 Based on the model described in Section 2, we have Theorem 1. Assume that (1) the group KE protocol is secure against passive eavesdropping; (2) the IBE scheme is secure against the chosen-ciphertext attack; (3) the IBS scheme is existential unforgeability under the chosen-message attack; (4) the decisional squaring Diffie-Hellman (DSDH) problem is hard over a cyclic group G with a prime order q and a generator g; (5) CRHF is a collision-resistant hash family; then the protocol P described in Fig. 1 is a secure group PAKE protocol.
The detail proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present an efficient compiler to transform any group KE protocol to a group PAKE protocol from identity-based cryptosystem. In addition, we provide a rigorous proof of security for our compiler. As long as our group PAKE protocol is built on a group KE protocol, and IBE and IBS schemes with provable security without random oracles, it can be proven to be secure without random oracles.
1. At any point during the experiment, an oracle-generated message (e.g., msg A or msg S ) is repeated.
2. At any point during the experiment, a collision occurs in the hash function H (regardless of whether this is due to a direct action of the adversary, or whether this occurs during the course of the simulator's response to an oracle query).
It is immediate that events 1 occurs with only negligible probability, event 2 occurs with negligible probability assuming CRHF as a collision-resistant hash family. Put everything together, we are able to see that Claim 1. If CRHF is a collision-resistant hash family, |Adv
In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adversary A as in experiment P 1 except that the adversary's queries to Execute oracles are handled differently: for any Execute(A in the end of experiment P 1 , the initial group key sk P A ( = 1, 2, · · · , n) established during the group key exchange protocol P are replaced with a random value from an appropriate set.
The difference between the current experiment and the previous one is bounded by the probability that an adversary breaks the security of the group key exchange protocol P . More precisely, we have Claim 2. If the group key exchange protocol P is secure against passive eavesdropping, |Adv
Assume that there are m such Execute queries in the end of experiment P 1 , the claim is proved by m sub-experiments P = P 1 , we only need to prove |Adv
A (k)| (where 1 ≤ t ≤ m) to be negligible.
If |Adv
n , S j ), we show that the simulator can use A as a subroutine to perform the passive attack to the GKE protocol P as follows.
Given the parameters params P of a GKE protocol P , the simulator runs the initialization protocol as shown in Fig. 2 , expect that params P is not generated. To respond to those Execute queries with Reveal asked by the adversary A, the simulator queries Execute P and Reveal P to the protocol P at first. When A asks Execute(A i 1 1 , · · · , A in n , S j ) query, the simulator queries
1 ) = sk b where b ∈ {0, 1}, sk 0 is the group key while sk 1 is a random value from Ω. Let sk
) and responds to A. When b = 0, the distribution of adversary's view in the current experiment and P (t−1) 2 are identical, and thus the adversary has the same Adv are identical, and thus the adversary has the same Adv
A (k)| is non-negligible, the simulator can decide when b = 0 or b = 1 with a non-negligible advantage, and thus win the game against the protocol P .
Since the GKE protocol P is assumed to be secure against the passive attack, |Adv
A (k)| must be negligible and Claim 2 is true. Experiment P 3 : In this experiment, the simulator interacts with the adversary A as in experiment P 2 except that the adversary's queries to Execute oracles are handled differently: for any Execute(A i 1 1 , · · · , A in n , S j ) oracle where the adversary has not queried Reveal(
in the end of experiment P 2 , the final group key sk i A ( = 1, 2, · · · , n) are replaced with a random value from G.
The difference between the current experiment and the previous one is bounded by the probability to solve the decisional squaring Diffie-Hellman (DSDH) problem over a cyclic group G with a prime order q and a generator g. More precisely, we have Claim 3. If the decisional squaring Diffie-Hellman (DSDH) problem is hard over (G, q, g), |Adv
If the above difference is non-negligible, we show that the simulator can use A as a subroutine to solve the DSDH problem with non-negligible probability as follows.
Given a DSDH problem (g, g a , Z), where a is randomly chosen from Z * q and Z is either g a 2 (denoted as b = 0) or a random element z from G (denoted as b = 1), the simulator (without knowledge of a and b) runs the initialization protocol as shown in Fig. 2, except that (G, q, g ) is not generated. To respond to Execute(A
n , S j ) query where the adversary A has not queried Reveal(A i ) ( = 1, 2, · · · , n), the simulator chooses a random number r ∈ Z * q and lets sid i A = (g a ) r and sk i A = Z r 2 ( = 1, 2, · · · , n). Because all initial group keys have been replaced with random values in experiment P 2 , when b = 0, the distribution of adversary's view in the current experiment and P 2 are identical, and thus the adversary has the same Adv P 2 A (k); when b = 1, the distribution of adversary's view in the current experiment and P 3 are identical, and thus the adversary has the same Adv
A (k)| is non-negligible, the simulator can decide when b = 0 or b = 1 with a non-negligible advantage, and thus solve the DSDH problem. Therefore, the above difference must be negligible and the claim is true.
In experiment P 3 , the adversary's probability of correctly guessing the bit b used by the Test oracle is exactly 1/2 if the Test query is made to a fresh client instance A i invoked by an Execute oracle, where the freshness only requires that the adversary has not queried Reveal(A i ) or Reveal(B j ) with the client instances A i and B j being partnered. This is so because the final group keys for such instances in P 3 are chosen at random from G, and hence there is no way to distinguish whether the Test oracle outputs a random group key or the "actual" group key (which is just a random element, anyway).
Note that an adversary is allowed to ask the above Test oracle even if he has queried KeyGen or Corrupt oracles, but the probability of correctly guessing the bit b is 1/2, too. Therefore, a server adversary never succeed in the game.
The remainder of the proof concentrates on the instances invoked by Send oracles.
Experiment P 4 : In this experiment, we modify the simulator's responses to Send 1 and Send 2 queries. Before describing this change we introduce some terminology. The simulator first runs the protocol initialization as shown in Fig. 2 . For a query Send 1 (S j , (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An )), where (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An ) is adversarially-generated, if equation (1) holds for = 1, 2, · · · , n, then (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An ) is said to be valid. Otherwise, (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An ) is said to be invalid. Similarly, for a query Send 2 (A i , msg S ) where msg S is adversarially-generated, if equation (2) holds, then msg S is said to be valid. Otherwise, msg S is said to be invalid. Informally, valid messages use correct passwords or signing keys while invalid messages do not. Given this terminology, we continue with our description of experiment P 4 . When the adversary makes oracle queries Send 1 (S j , (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An )), the simulator examines (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An ). If it is adversarially-generated and valid, the query is answered as in experiment P 4 except that acc j S is assigned the special value ∇. In any other case, (i.e., (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An ) is oracle-generated, or adversarially-generated but invalid), the query is answered exactly as in experiment P 4 . When the adversary makes oracle queries Send 2 (A i , msg S ), the simulator examines msg S . If msg S is adversarially-generated and valid, the query is answered as in experiment P 3 except that acc i A is assigned the special value ∇. In any other case, (i.e., msg S is oracle-generated, or adversarially-generated but invalid), the query is answered exactly as in experiment P 3 .
Finally, the definition of the adversary's success in P 4 is changed. If the adversary ever queries Send 1 or Send 2 with acc j S = ∇ or acc i A = ∇, the simulator halts and the adversary succeeds. Otherwise the adversary's success is determined as in experiment P 3 .
The distribution on the adversary's view in experiments P 3 and P 4 are identical up to the point when the adversary queries Send 1 or Send 2 with acc
If such a query is never made, the distributions on the view are identical. Therefore, we have
In experiment P 4 , the adversary A succeeds if one of the following occurs: (1) the adversary queries Send 1 (S j , (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An )) for adversarially-generated and valid (msg A 1 , · · · , msg An ), that is, acc j S = ∇ (let Succ 1 denote this event); (2) the adversary queries Send 2 (A i , msg S ) for adversarially-generated and valid msg S , that is, acc i A = ∇ (let Succ 2 denote this event); (3) neither Succ 1 nor Succ 2 happens, the adversary wins the game by a Test query to a fresh client instance A i .
In the last event, if the fresh client instance A i is invoked by Send oracles, the messages in these Send oracles have to be oracle-generated. In this case, the group of these Send oracles form an Execute oracle, where the final group key sk i A can be replaced by a random value from G on the basis of Claims 1 to 3.
To evaluate Pr
, we do the following experiment. Experiment P 5 . Given the parameters (params S ) of IBS, the simulator responds to all oracle queries as in experiment P 4 except that it begins by running a modified initialization as follows.
For each (A, S) ∈ ClientServerPair, pw
Return Client, Server, ClientServerPair, G, q, g, h, H, params
The distribution of the adversary's view on experiments P 4 and P 5 are identical. For KeyGen queries asked by the adversary A, the simulator has the adversary A to query the challenger of the IBS scheme. Each time the simulator responds to Send 1 query asked by A, it checks if the messages are valid or not (note that it knows the decryption key d S and passwords). For oracle-generated Send 1 query, the simulator has A to query the signing oracle S d S of the IBS scheme on the message pid j S |sid j S and returns the signature Auth S . In addition, the simulator responds to all other oracles as in P 4 .
In case that the adversary A queried Send 2 (A i , msg S ) to a fresh client instance A i for adversarially-generated and valid msg S (that is, acc i A = ∇), the adversary A uses it to forge a signature of the signer S on the message msg S . The freshness of A i ensures that the adversary has not queried KeyGen(PKG, S) before Send 2 (A i , msg S ) oracle query.
If Pr
is non-negligible, the advantage of the forger A attacking the IBS scheme is non-negligible. It is in contradiction with the assumption that the IBS scheme has existential unforgeability. Therefore, Pr = P 5 , we only need to prove |Adv
If |Adv
is the sub-experiment for (A i λ λ , S j ), we show that the simulator can use A as a subroutine to perform the chosen-ciphertext attack to the IBE as follows.
Given public parameters params E for an instance of the IBE scheme, the simulator begins by running a modified initialization protocol as follows.
Assume that the simulator wishes to challenge the two equal length plaintexts (M 0 , M 1 ) and the identity ID S . Given the ciphertext C = E ID S (M b ) where b ∈ {0, 1} is unknown, the simulator responds all of the adversary's queries as in experiment P (t−1) 6 except from Execute and Send 0 queries related to A i λ λ and S j as shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , respectively. Note that an adversarially-generated message which contains A |sid Since the IBE is assumed to be secure against the chosen-ciphertext attack, |Adv
A (k)| must be negligible and Claim 2 is true. Now let us consider an adversarially-generated Send 1 (S j , (A i |sid i A |Auth ) 1,2,···,n ) query to a fresh server instance S j . The freshness of S j implies that the adversary has not queried KeyGen(PKG, S) oracle and any Corrupt(A ) ( = 1, 2, · · · , n). In experiment P 6 , all messages which are dependent of pw S A ( = 1, 2, · · · , n) have been replaced by those which are independent of these passwords. Therefore, the adversary's view is independent of the passwords pw S A ( = 1, 2, · · · , n) chosen by the simulator. In order to win the game, the adversary has to try all passwords one-by-one in an online impersonation attack. The probability that Succ 1 occurs is at most Q(k)/N , where Q(k) is the number of online attacks made by the adversary A.
In experiment P 6 , the adversary succeeds if either Succ 1 or Succ 2 occurs, or else by guessing the value of b used by the Test oracle. However, if neither Succ 1 nor Succ 2 occurs and the adversary queries Test(A i ) where A i is fresh and acc i U = TRUE, then sk i A is randomly-distributed in G independent of the adversary's view. Thus, the adversary's probability of success when neither Succ 1 nor Succ 2 occurs is 1/2. The preceding discussion implies that P r for some negligible function ε(·) and therefore the adversary's advantage in P 0 (i.e., the original protocol) is at most Q(k)/N plus some negligible quantity. This complete the proof of the theorem.
